| dc.contributor.author | Renault, Jérôme | |
| dc.contributor.author | Tomala, Tristan | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-04-29T07:47:50Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2011-04-29T07:47:50Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2004 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6103 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.subject | Repeated games | en |
| dc.subject | Imperfect monitoring | en |
| dc.subject | Communication equilibria | en |
| dc.subject.ddc | 519 | en |
| dc.subject.classificationjel | C72 | en |
| dc.subject.classificationjel | C73 | en |
| dc.title | Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring | en |
| dc.type | Article accepté pour publication ou publié | |
| dc.description.abstracten | We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. For two-player games, a characterization is provided by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (Repeated games, Part A (1994) CORE DP 9420), mainly using Lehrer's (Math. Operations Res. (1992) 175) result for correlated equilibria. The main result of this paper is to extend this characterization to the n-player case. The proof of the characterization relies on an analogy with an auxiliary 2-player repeated game with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. We use Kohlberg's (Int. J. Game Theory (1975) 7) result to construct explicitly a canonical communication device for each communication equilibrium payoff. | en |
| dc.relation.isversionofjnlname | Games and Economic Behavior | |
| dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol | 49 | en |
| dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue | 2 | en |
| dc.relation.isversionofjnldate | 2004 | |
| dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages | 313-344 | en |
| dc.relation.isversionofdoi | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.12.005 | en |
| dc.description.sponsorshipprivate | oui | en |
| dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisher | Elsevier | en |
| dc.subject.ddclabel | Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées | en |
