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dc.contributor.authorRenault, Jérôme
dc.contributor.authorTomala, Tristan
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-29T07:47:50Z
dc.date.available2011-04-29T07:47:50Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6103
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectRepeated gamesen
dc.subjectImperfect monitoringen
dc.subjectCommunication equilibriaen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.subject.classificationjelC73en
dc.titleCommunication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoringen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. For two-player games, a characterization is provided by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (Repeated games, Part A (1994) CORE DP 9420), mainly using Lehrer's (Math. Operations Res. (1992) 175) result for correlated equilibria. The main result of this paper is to extend this characterization to the n-player case. The proof of the characterization relies on an analogy with an auxiliary 2-player repeated game with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. We use Kohlberg's (Int. J. Game Theory (1975) 7) result to construct explicitly a canonical communication device for each communication equilibrium payoff.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameGames and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol49en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2004
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages313-344en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.12.005en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen


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