Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
Renault, Jérôme; Tomala, Tristan (2004), Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring, Games and Economic Behavior, 49, 2, p. 313-344. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.12.005
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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2004Nom de la revue
Games and Economic BehaviorVolume
49Numéro
2Éditeur
Elsevier
Pages
313-344
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We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. For two-player games, a characterization is provided by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (Repeated games, Part A (1994) CORE DP 9420), mainly using Lehrer's (Math. Operations Res. (1992) 175) result for correlated equilibria. The main result of this paper is to extend this characterization to the n-player case. The proof of the characterization relies on an analogy with an auxiliary 2-player repeated game with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. We use Kohlberg's (Int. J. Game Theory (1975) 7) result to construct explicitly a canonical communication device for each communication equilibrium payoff.Mots-clés
Repeated games; Imperfect monitoring; Communication equilibriaPublications associées
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