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Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

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Date
2004
Dewey
Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées
Sujet
Repeated games; Imperfect monitoring; Communication equilibria
JEL code
C72; C73
Journal issue
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
49
Number
2
Publication date
2004
Article pages
313-344
Publisher
Elsevier
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.12.005
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6103
Collections
  • CEREMADE : Publications
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Author
Renault, Jérôme
Tomala, Tristan
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. For two-player games, a characterization is provided by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (Repeated games, Part A (1994) CORE DP 9420), mainly using Lehrer's (Math. Operations Res. (1992) 175) result for correlated equilibria. The main result of this paper is to extend this characterization to the n-player case. The proof of the characterization relies on an analogy with an auxiliary 2-player repeated game with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. We use Kohlberg's (Int. J. Game Theory (1975) 7) result to construct explicitly a canonical communication device for each communication equilibrium payoff.

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