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dc.contributor.authorTomala, Tristan
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-29T07:43:36Z
dc.date.available2011-04-29T07:43:36Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6102
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectRepeated gamesen
dc.subjectImperfect monitoringen
dc.subjectCommunication equilibriaen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.subject.classificationjelC73en
dc.titlePerfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoringen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThis paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This concept is a refinement of Myerson's [Myerson, R.B., 1982. Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal agent problems, J. Math. Econ. 10, 67–81] communication equilibrium. A communication equilibrium is perfect if it induces a communication equilibrium of the continuation game, after every history of messages of the mediator. We provide a characterization of the set of corresponding equilibrium payoffs and derive a Folk Theorem for discounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameGames and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol67en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2009
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages682-694en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.005en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen


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