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Repeated Communication Through the Mechanism And

Gossner, Olivier; Vieille, Nicolas (2001), Repeated Communication Through the Mechanism And, International Journal of Game Theory, 30, 1, p. 41-60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820100063

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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2001
Journal name
International Journal of Game Theory
Volume
30
Number
1
Publisher
Springer
Pages
41-60
Publication identifier
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Author(s)
Gossner, Olivier
Vieille, Nicolas
Abstract (EN)
We consider the “and” communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication are allowed.
Subjects / Keywords
"And" communication device
JEL
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory