Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorSolan, Eilon
dc.contributor.authorVieille, Nicolas
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-19T14:05:01Z
dc.date.available2011-04-19T14:05:01Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6019
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectstochastic gamesen
dc.subjectcorrelated equilibriumen
dc.subjectpositive recursive gamesen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.subject.classificationjelC73en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.titleCorrelated Equilibrium in Stochastic Gamesen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe study the existence of uniform correlated equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games. The correlation devices that we use are either autonomous (they base their choice of signal on previous signals, but not on previous states or actions) or stationary (their choice is independent of any data and is drawn according to the same probability distribution at every stage). We prove that any n-player stochastic game admits an autonomous correlated equilibrium payoff. When the game is positive and recursive, a stationary correlated equilibrium payoff exists.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameGames and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol38en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2002
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages362-399en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0887en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen


Files in this item

FilesSizeFormatView

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record