Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games

Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas

Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas (2002), Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 38, 2, p. 362-399. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0887

Type

Article accepté pour publication ou publié

Date

2002

Journal name

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

Number

Publisher

Elsevier

Pages

362-399

Abstract (EN)

We study the existence of uniform correlated equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games. The correlation devices that we use are either autonomous (they base their choice of signal on previous signals, but not on previous states or actions) or stationary (their choice is independent of any data and is drawn according to the same probability distribution at every stage). We prove that any n-player stochastic game admits an autonomous correlated equilibrium payoff. When the game is positive and recursive, a stationary correlated equilibrium payoff exists.

Subjects / Keywords

stochastic games; correlated equilibrium; positive recursive games

JEL

C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
C72 - Noncooperative Games