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dc.contributor.authorBardey, David
dc.contributor.authorCremer, Helmuth
dc.contributor.authorLozachmeur, Jean-Marie
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-18T13:53:33Z
dc.date.available2011-04-18T13:53:33Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5992
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectTwo-Sided marketsen
dc.subjectCommon Network Externalityen
dc.subjectHealthen
dc.subjectEducationen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelD42en
dc.subject.classificationjelL11en
dc.subject.classificationjelL12en
dc.titleCompetition in two-sided markets with common network externalitiesen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstractenWe study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the standard inter-group effects. This type of externality occurs when both groups benefit, possibly with different intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satisfies an homogeneity condition then platforms'profits and price structure have some specific properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to other, according to the homogeneity degree. In the specific but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platforms'profit do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This is in sharp contrast to conventional results stating that the presence of network externalities in a two-sided market structure increases the intensity of competition when the externality is positive (and decreases it when the externality is negative). Prices are affected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers. Finally, we show that a transaction fee leads to a lower remuneration for providers than a flat salary scheme. This, in turn, results in a lower prices level so that profits are the same under both regimes.en
dc.publisher.nameUniversité Paris-Dauphineen
dc.publisher.cityParisen
dc.identifier.citationpages26en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleCahiers de la Chaire Santéen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber5en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen


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