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dc.contributor.authorNaegelen, Florence
dc.contributor.authorMougeot, Michel
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-18T13:50:10Z
dc.date.available2011-04-18T13:50:10Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5991
dc.descriptionParu dans les Cahiers de la Chaire Santé, n°6, juin 2010en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectregulationen
dc.subjectpower of incentive schemesen
dc.subjectaltruismen
dc.subjectpublic organizationen
dc.subjectcountervailing incentivesen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelL3en
dc.subject.classificationjelD8en
dc.subject.classificationjelD2en
dc.titlePower of incentives with motivated agents in public organizationsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenPublic service motivation is often considered as an argument for low- powered incentive schemes in the public sector. In this paper, we characterize the optimal contract between a public regulator and an altruistic agent according to the degree of public service motivation, when the type of the public service consumer is privately observed. We show that the requested effort is non decreasing with and can be higher than the first best level. Moreover we show that the agent is put on a high powered contract when some customers are served but that this contract is associated with different types of consumers according to : In contrast, the agent is never put on a cost-plus contract. Finally, we show that the first best allocation can be achieved under budget balance for a degree of altruism higher than a threshold that we characterize.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Public Economic Theory
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol13
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue3
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2011
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages391-416
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01505.x
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherWileyen
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen


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