• français
    • English
  • français 
    • français
    • English
  • Connexion
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.
Accueil

Afficher

Cette collectionPar Date de CréationAuteursTitresSujetsNoms de revueToute la baseCentres de recherche & CollectionsPar Date de CréationAuteursTitresSujetsNoms de revue

Mon compte

Connexion

Statistiques

Afficher les statistiques d'usage

Power of incentives with motivated agents in public organizations

Thumbnail
Ouvrir
chaireS_6.PDF (562.7Kb)
Date
2011
Description
Paru dans les Cahiers de la Chaire Santé, n°6, juin 2010
Indexation documentaire
Microéconomie
Subject
regulation; power of incentive schemes; altruism; public organization; countervailing incentives
Code JEL
L3; D8; D2
Nom de la revue
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume
13
Numéro
3
Date de publication
2011
Pages article
391-416
Nom de l'éditeur
Wiley
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01505.x
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5991
Collections
  • LEDa : Publications
Métadonnées
Afficher la notice complète
Auteur
Naegelen, Florence
Mougeot, Michel
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Résumé en anglais
Public service motivation is often considered as an argument for low- powered incentive schemes in the public sector. In this paper, we characterize the optimal contract between a public regulator and an altruistic agent according to the degree of public service motivation, when the type of the public service consumer is privately observed. We show that the requested effort is non decreasing with and can be higher than the first best level. Moreover we show that the agent is put on a high powered contract when some customers are served but that this contract is associated with different types of consumers according to : In contrast, the agent is never put on a cost-plus contract. Finally, we show that the first best allocation can be achieved under budget balance for a degree of altruism higher than a threshold that we characterize.

  • Accueil Bibliothèque
  • Site de l'Université Paris-Dauphine
  • Contact
SCD Paris Dauphine - Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16

 Cette création est mise à disposition sous un contrat Creative Commons.