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dc.contributor.authorGarcia Marinoso, Begona
dc.contributor.authorJelovac, Izabella
dc.contributor.authorOlivella, Pau
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-18T13:43:05Z
dc.date.available2011-04-18T13:43:05Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5987
dc.descriptionParu dans les Cahiers de la Chaire Santé, n°7, octobre 2010en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectpharmaceuticalsen
dc.subjectexternal referencingen
dc.subjectprice negotiationen
dc.subject.ddc338en
dc.subject.classificationjelL65en
dc.subject.classificationjelI18en
dc.titleExternal referencing and pharmaceutical price negociationen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenExternal referencing (ER) imposes a price cap for pharmaceuticals, based on prices of identical or comparable products in foreign countries. Suppose a foreign country (F) negotiates prices with a pharmaceutical firm, whereas a home country (H) can either negotiate prices independently or implement ER, based on the foreign price. We show that country H prefers ER if copayments in H are relatively high. This preference is reinforced when H's population is small. Irrespective of relative country sizes, ER by country H harms country F. Our model is inspired by the wide European experience with this cost-containment policy. Namely, in Europe, drug authorization and price negotiations are carried out by separate agencies. We confirm our main results in two extensions. The first one allows for therapeutic competition between drugs. In the second one, drug authorization and price negotiation take place in a single agency.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameHealth Economics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol20en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue6en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2011
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages737-756en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1002/hec.1630en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherWileyen
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie industrielleen


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