Negotiating over small bundles of resources
Chevaleyre, Yann; Endriss, Ulle; Lang, Jérôme; Maudet, Nicolas (2005), Negotiating over small bundles of resources, in Wooldridge, Michael, 4th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2005), July 25-29, 2005, Utrecht, The Netherlands, ACM, p. 296-302
TypeCommunication / Conférence
Book title4th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2005), July 25-29, 2005, Utrecht, The Netherlands
Book authorWooldridge, Michael
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Abstract (EN)When rational but myopic agents negotiate over the exchange of indivisible resources, any restriction to the negotiation protocol may prevent the system from convergingto a socially optimal allocation in the general case. This paper addresses this issue by analysing how the conﬁnement tocertain classes of utility functions can enable agents to moveto an optimal allocation by negotiating over small bundlesof items at a time. In particular, we consider so-called k-separable domains, where the full set of resources can bedivided into several preferentially independent bundles oflimited cardinality.
Subjects / KeywordsUtility theory; Multiagent resource allocation; Social choice and welfare; Negotiation
Showing items related by title and author.
Chevaleyre, Yann; Dunne, Paul; Endriss, Ulle; Lang, Jérôme; Lemaître, Michel; Maudet, Nicolas; Padget, Julian; Phelps, Steve; Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan A.; Sousa, Paulo (2006) Article accepté pour publication ou publié