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How Equitable is Rational Negotiation?

Estivie, Sylvia; Chevaleyre, Yann; Endriss, Ulle; Maudet, Nicolas (2006), How Equitable is Rational Negotiation?, in Nakashima, Hideyuki; Wellman, Michael P.; Weiss, Gerhard; Stone, Peter, Proceedings of the 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2006), Hakodate, Japan, May 8-12, 2006, ACM Press, p. 866-873. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1160633.1160788

Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2006
Conference title
5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2006)
Conference date
2006-05
Conference city
Hakodate
Conference country
Japon
Book title
Proceedings of the 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2006), Hakodate, Japan, May 8-12, 2006
Book author
Nakashima, Hideyuki; Wellman, Michael P.; Weiss, Gerhard; Stone, Peter
Publisher
ACM Press
ISBN
1-59593-303-4
Pages
866-873
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1160633.1160788
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Estivie, Sylvia
Chevaleyre, Yann
Endriss, Ulle
Maudet, Nicolas cc
Abstract (EN)
Notions of fairness have recently received increased attention in the context of resource allocation problems, pushed by diverse applications where not only pure utilitarian efficiency is sought. In this paper, we study a framework where allocations of goods result from distributed negotiation conducted by autonomous agents implementing very simple deals. Assuming that these agents are strictly self-interested, we investigate how equitable the outcomes of such negotiation processes are. We first discuss a number of methodological issues raised by this study, pertaining in particular to the design of suitable payment functions as a means of distributing the social surplus generated by a deal amongst the participating agents. By running different experiments, we finally identify conditions favouring equitable outcomes.
Subjects / Keywords
Fair division; Social welfare; Negotiation; Multiagent resource allocation

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