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Preference-based English reverse auctions

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Date
2011
Dewey
Intelligence artificielle
Sujet
Preference-based auctions; Automated agents; Multi-attribute English reverse auctions; Multiple criteria decision analysis; Non-transitive and partial preferences
Journal issue
Artificial Intelligence
Volume
175
Number
7-8
Publication date
2011
Article pages
1449-1467
Publisher
Elsevier
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2010.11.015
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5579
Collections
  • LAMSADE : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Bellosta, Marie-Jo
Kornman, Sylvie
Vanderpooten, Daniel
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
This paper studies English reverse auctions within a unified framework for preference-based English reverse auctions. In this context, and particularly for electronic auctions, representing and handling the buyer's preferences, so as to enable him/her to obtain the best possible outcome, is a major issue. Existing auction mechanisms, which are based on single or multi-attribute utility functions, are only able to represent transitive and complete preferences. It is well known, however, in the preference modeling literature that more general preference structures, allowing intransitivity and incomparability, are more appropriate to capture preferences. On the other hand, we must also consider properties on the evolution and, above all, on the outcome of any auction executed by an auction mechanism. These properties, as well as properties of non-dominance and fair competition defined for multiple criteria auctions, impose restrictions on the preference relation. This leaves room for interesting preference models to be implemented within English reverse auction mechanisms.

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