A framework for multiple criteria English reverse auctions
Bellosta, Marie-Jo; Kornman, Sylvie; Vanderpooten, Daniel (2005), A framework for multiple criteria English reverse auctions, in Zhong, Ning, Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, Compiegne, France, September 19-22, 2005, IEEE Computer Society : Los Alamitos, CA, p. 633-639
TypeCommunication / Conférence
Book titleProceedings of the 2005 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, Compiegne, France, September 19-22, 2005
Book authorZhong, Ning
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Abstract (EN)In this paper we present a general framework for defining peer-to-peer multiple criteria reverse English auction mechanisms, called MERA. In order to define a specific mechanism, we need to specify (i) the family of preference relations, (ii) the type of request, and (iii) the family of initial constraints that can be accepted by the mechanism. This framework provides the buyer agent with a general strategy to manage auctions. We study efficiency of auctions defined within the MERA framework. We introduce two properties commonly used in multiple criteria decision analysis: bid non-dominance and attainability of non-dominated bids.
Subjects / KeywordsMERA; multiple criteria decision analysis
Showing items related by title and author.
Pinson, Suzanne; Bellosta, Marie-Jo; Vanderpooten, Daniel; Brigui, Imène; Kornman, Sylvie (2007) Article accepté pour publication ou publié