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dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
dc.contributor.authorMinelli, Enrico
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-12T13:11:06Z
dc.date.available2011-01-12T13:11:06Z
dc.date.issued2001
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5452
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectExchange economyen
dc.subjectcoreen
dc.subjectasymmetric informationen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelD51en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelC71en
dc.titleA note on the incentive compatible coreen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe identify particular exchange economies with asymmetric information in which the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty provided that coalitions can allocate goods by means of random mechanisms. Both the use of random mechanisms and the restriction to a specific class of economies are crucial for the result. Indeed, the ex ante incentive compatible core can be empty (i) in our class of economies if coalitions can only use deterministic mechanisms and (ii) outside this class, even if random mechanisms are allowed.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Economic Theory
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol98en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2001
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages179-188en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2759en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen


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