A note on the incentive compatible core

Forges, Françoise; Minelli, Enrico

Forges, Françoise; Minelli, Enrico (2001), A note on the incentive compatible core, Journal of Economic Theory, 98, 1, p. 179-188. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2759

Type

Article accepté pour publication ou publié

Date

2001

Journal name

Journal of Economic Theory

Volume

Number

Publisher

Elsevier

Pages

179-188

Abstract (EN)

We identify particular exchange economies with asymmetric information in which the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty provided that coalitions can allocate goods by means of random mechanisms. Both the use of random mechanisms and the restriction to a specific class of economies are crucial for the result. Indeed, the ex ante incentive compatible core can be empty (i) in our class of economies if coalitions can only use deterministic mechanisms and (ii) outside this class, even if random mechanisms are allowed.

Subjects / Keywords

Exchange economy; core; asymmetric information

JEL

D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
C71 - Cooperative Games