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Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies

Forges, Françoise; Heifetz, Aviad; Minelli, Enrico (2001), Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies, Economic theory, 18, 2, p. 349-365. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/PL00004188

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2001
Journal name
Economic theory
Volume
18
Number
2
Publisher
Springer
Pages
349-365
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Forges, Françoise
Heifetz, Aviad
Minelli, Enrico
Abstract (EN)
If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed as an element of the core of the n-fold replicated economy, for every n. The converse holds under the further assumption of independent private values but not in general, as shown by a counter-example.
Subjects / Keywords
Incentive compatibility; General equilibrium; Core
JEL
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
C71 - Cooperative Games
D51 - Exchange and Production Economies