Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings

dc.contributor.author	Ettinger, David
dc.date.accessioned	2011-01-12T12:25:42Z
dc.date.available	2011-01-12T12:25:42Z
dc.date.issued	2003
dc.identifier.uri	https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5448
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.subject	Auctions	en
dc.subject	Crossholdings	en
dc.subject	Efficiency	en
dc.subject.ddc	338.5	en
dc.subject.classificationjel	D44	en
dc.title	Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings	en
dc.type	Article accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstracten	We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlname	Economics Letters
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol	80	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue	1	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate	2003
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages	1-7	en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00024-7	en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivate	oui	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisher	Elsevier	en
dc.subject.ddclabel	Microéconomie	en

Related items