Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings

Ettinger, David

Ettinger, David (2003), Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings, Economics Letters, 80, 1, p. 1-7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00024-7

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Type

Article accepté pour publication ou publié

Date

2003

Journal name

Economics Letters

Volume

Number

Publisher

Elsevier

Pages

1-7

Abstract (EN)

We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.

Subjects / Keywords

Auctions; Crossholdings; Efficiency

JEL

D44 - Auctions