
Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings
Ettinger, David (2003), Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings, Economics Letters, 80, 1, p. 1-7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00024-7
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Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2003Journal name
Economics LettersVolume
80Number
1Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
1-7
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Ettinger, DavidAbstract (EN)
We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.Subjects / Keywords
Auctions; Crossholdings; EfficiencyJEL
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