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A theory of deception

dc.contributor.authorJehiel, Philippe
dc.contributor.authorEttinger, David
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-10T15:33:40Z
dc.date.available2011-01-10T15:33:40Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5434
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectbelief manipulationen
dc.subjectdeceptionen
dc.subjectBargaining Theoryen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelC78en
dc.subject.classificationjelD83en
dc.subject.classificationjelD84en
dc.titleA theory of deceptionen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversité de Cergy-Pontoise;France
dc.description.abstractenThis paper proposes an equilibrium approach to belief manipulation and deception in which agents only have coarse knowledge of their opponent's strategy. Equilibrium requires the coarse knowledge available to agents to be correct, and the inferences and optimizations to be made on the basis of the simplest theories compatible with the available knowledge. The approach can be viewed as formalizing into a game theoretic setting a well documented bias in social psychology, the fundamental attribution error. It is applied to a bargaining problem, thereby revealing a deceptive tactic that is hard to explain in the full rationality paradigm.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameAmerican economic journal : Microeconomics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2010
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages1-20en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.1.1en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherAmerican Economic Associationen
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen


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