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A theory of deception

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Date
2010
Dewey
Microéconomie
Sujet
belief manipulation; deception; Bargaining Theory
JEL code
C78; D83; D84
Journal issue
American economic journal : Microeconomics
Volume
2
Number
1
Publication date
2010
Article pages
1-20
Publisher
American Economic Association
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.1.1
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5434
Collections
  • LEDa : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Jehiel, Philippe
Ettinger, David
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to belief manipulation and deception in which agents only have coarse knowledge of their opponent's strategy. Equilibrium requires the coarse knowledge available to agents to be correct, and the inferences and optimizations to be made on the basis of the simplest theories compatible with the available knowledge. The approach can be viewed as formalizing into a game theoretic setting a well documented bias in social psychology, the fundamental attribution error. It is applied to a bargaining problem, thereby revealing a deceptive tactic that is hard to explain in the full rationality paradigm.

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