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dc.contributor.authorBarigozzi, Francesca
dc.contributor.authorVilleneuve, Bertrand
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-07T10:24:01Z
dc.date.available2011-01-07T10:24:01Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5402
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjecttax policyen
dc.subjectmarginal cost of public fundsen
dc.subjectinformation biasen
dc.subjectsignalingen
dc.subject.ddc336en
dc.subject.classificationjelH20en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelH30en
dc.subject.classificationjelI18en
dc.titleThe signaling effect of tax policyen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversité de Toulouse;France
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversity of Bologna;Italie
dc.description.abstractenThe paper focuses on the signaling value of a tax when agents are less informed than the government on the effect of their consumption. The policy making process is analyzed as a game in which the government wants to influence consumers' behaviors through tax policy, consumers being rational and Bayesian. The marginal cost of public funds induces the government to provide biased information to pursue budgetary objectives. We analyze the tax distortion that is required for credibility.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of public economic theory
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol8en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue4en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2006-10
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages611-630en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00281.xen
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherWileyen
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie publiqueen


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