
The signaling effect of tax policy
Barigozzi, Francesca; Villeneuve, Bertrand (2006), The signaling effect of tax policy, Journal of public economic theory, 8, 4, p. 611-630. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00281.x
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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2006Journal name
Journal of public economic theoryVolume
8Number
4Publisher
Wiley
Pages
611-630
Publication identifier
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Show full item recordAbstract (EN)
The paper focuses on the signaling value of a tax when agents are less informed than the government on the effect of their consumption. The policy making process is analyzed as a game in which the government wants to influence consumers' behaviors through tax policy, consumers being rational and Bayesian. The marginal cost of public funds induces the government to provide biased information to pursue budgetary objectives. We analyze the tax distortion that is required for credibility.Subjects / Keywords
tax policy; marginal cost of public funds; information bias; signalingRelated items
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