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dc.contributor.authorJeleva, Meglena
dc.contributor.authorVilleneuve, Bertrand
HAL ID: 745441
ORCID: 0000-0001-7485-9262
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-04T09:25:22Z
dc.date.available2011-01-04T09:25:22Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5358
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectImprecise probabilitiesen
dc.subjectInsurance marketsen
dc.subjectAdverse selectionen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelG22en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelD81en
dc.titleInsurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selectionen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherCEA-IDEI Université de Toulouse 1;France
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherLEN-C3E, Université de Nantes;France
dc.description.abstractenThis article deals with optimal insurance contracts in the framework of imprecise probabilities and adverse selection. Agents differ not only in the objective risk they face but also in the perception of risk. In monopoly, a range of configurations that VNM preferences preclude appears: a pooling contract may be optimal, incomplete coverage may be offered to high risks, low risks may be better covered.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameEconomic theory
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol23en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue4en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2004
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages777-794en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0396-xen
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringeren
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen


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