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Optimal risk-sharing under adverse selection and imperfect risk perception

Chassagnon, Arnold; Villeneuve, Bertrand (2005), Optimal risk-sharing under adverse selection and imperfect risk perception, Canadian journal of economics, 38, 3, p. 955-978. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0008-4085.2005.00311.x

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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2005
Journal name
Canadian journal of economics
Volume
38
Number
3
Publisher
Wiley
Pages
955-978
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0008-4085.2005.00311.x
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Chassagnon, Arnold
Villeneuve, Bertrand cc
Abstract (FR)
Cet article examine en détail les allocations d’assurance de second-rang dans une économie soumise à l’antisélection. Partant d’une extension naturelle du modèle classique, nous supposons une perception imparfaite du risque. Nous caractérisons les contraintes qui s’exercent sur la redistribution des richesses et nous résumons les différentes possibilités grâce aux notions d’antisélection faible et d’antisélection forte. Pour finir, nous montrons en quel sens l’amélioration de la perception du risque améliore le bien-être.
Abstract (EN)
The present paper thoroughly explores second-best efficient allocations in an insurance economy with adverse selection. We start with a natural extension of the classical model, assuming less than perfect risk perception. We characterize the constraints on efficient redistribution, and we summarize the incidence of incentives on the economy with the notions of weak and strong adverse selection. Finally, we show in what sense improving risk perception enhances welfare.
Subjects / Keywords
Insurance; Principal-agent; adverse selection; welfare theorems; second-best optimum
JEL
G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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