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Competition between insurers with superior information

dc.contributor.authorVilleneuve, Bertrand
HAL ID: 745441
ORCID: 0000-0001-7485-9262
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-03T15:43:40Z
dc.date.available2011-01-03T15:43:40Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5356
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectInformed principalsen
dc.subjectCommon valueen
dc.subjectCompetition in mechanismsen
dc.subjectInsurance marketsen
dc.subjectAdverse selectionen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelG22en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelD43en
dc.titleCompetition between insurers with superior informationen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe analyze markets where insurers are better informed about risk than consumers. We show that even competitive markets may result in insufficient information revelation and inefficient insurance coverage. This explains why certain risky consumers remain uninsured and why certain market segments are persistently profitable. We also show robustness to competition in menus or mechanisms. Our analysis of the “contrary of adverse selection” (competition between principals with common value and exclusivity) is suitable for other markets (lawyers, doctors, mechanics, etc.).en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameEuropean economic review
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol49en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2005
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages321-340en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(03)00047-3en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen


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