• français
    • English
  • English 
    • français
    • English
  • Login
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.
BIRD Home

Browse

This CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsJournals BIRDResearch centres & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsJournals

My Account

Login

Statistics

View Usage Statistics

Extensive form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity

Thumbnail
View/Open
plugin-2006-21.pdf (165.1Kb)
Date
2008
Dewey
Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées
Sujet
polymonial-time comptable; extensive game; correlated equilibrium
Journal issue
Mathematics of Operations Research
Volume
33
Number
4
Publication date
2008
Article pages
1002-1022
Publisher
INFORMS
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1080.0340
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/535
Collections
  • CEREMADE : Publications
  • LEDa : Publications
Metadata
Show full item record
Author
Von Stengel, Bernhard
Forges, Françoise
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
This paper defines the extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) for extensive games with perfect recall. The EFCE concept extends Aumann's strategic-form correlated equilibrium (CE). Before the game starts, a correlation device generates a move for each information set. This move is recommended to the player only when the player reaches the information set. In two-player perfect-recall extensive games without chance moves, the set of EFCE can be described by a polynomial number of consistency and incentive constraints. Assuming P is not equal to NP, this is not possible for the set of CE, or if the game has chance moves.

  • Accueil Bibliothèque
  • Site de l'Université Paris-Dauphine
  • Contact
SCD Paris Dauphine - Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16

 Content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.0 France (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) license.