Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorChevaleyre, Yann
dc.contributor.authorEndriss, Ulle
dc.contributor.authorMaudet, Nicolas
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-16T08:58:14Z
dc.date.available2010-12-16T08:58:14Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5312
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectutility functionsen
dc.subjectallocation of resourcesen
dc.subjectnegotiationsen
dc.subject.ddc006.3en
dc.titleOn maximal classes of utility functions for efficient one-to-one negotiationen
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenWe investigate the properties of an abstract negotiation framework where agents autonomously negotiate over allocations of discrete resources. In this framework, reaching an optimal allocation potentially requires very complex multilateral deals. Therefore, we are interested in identifying classes of utility functions such that any negotiation conducted by means of deals involving only a single resource at time is bound to converge to an optimal allocation whenever all agents model their preferences using these functions. We show that the class of modular utility functions is not only sufficient but also maximal in this sense.en
dc.identifier.citationpages941-946en
dc.relation.ispartoftitleIJCAI-05, Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK, July 30-August 5, 2005.en
dc.relation.ispartofeditorKaelbling, Leslie Pack
dc.relation.ispartofeditorSaffiotti, Alessandro
dc.relation.ispartofpublnameProfessional Book Centeren
dc.relation.ispartofdate2005
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelIntelligence artificielleen
dc.relation.ispartofisbn0938075934en
dc.relation.conftitle19th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-2005)en
dc.relation.confdate2005-07
dc.relation.confcityEdimbourgen
dc.relation.confcountryRoyaume-Unien


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record