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dc.contributor.authorLang, Jérôme*
dc.contributor.authorPini, Maria Silvia*
dc.contributor.authorRossi, Francesca*
dc.contributor.authorVenable, Kristen Brent*
dc.contributor.authorWalsh, Toby*
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-18T10:54:18Z
dc.date.available2010-11-18T10:54:18Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5106
dc.descriptionHyderabad, Inde
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectPreference representation
dc.subjectvote
dc.subject.ddc006.3en
dc.titleWinner Determination in Sequential Majority Voting
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenPreferences can be aggregated using voting rules.We consider here the family of rules which performa sequence of pairwise majority comparisons between two candidates. The winner thus depends onthe chosen sequence of comparisons, which can berepresented by a binary tree. We address the difficulty of computing candidates that win for sometrees, and then introduce and study the notion offair winner, i.e. candidates who win in a balancedtree. We then consider the situation where we lackcomplete informations about preferences, and determine the computational complexity of computing winners in this case.
dc.identifier.citationpages1372-1377
dc.relation.ispartoftitleIJCAI 2007, International Joint Conferences on Artifical Intelligence - Proceedings
dc.relation.ispartofeditorVeloso, Manuela
dc.relation.ispartofpublnameAAAI Press / IJCAI
dc.relation.ispartofpublcityPalo Alto (USA)
dc.relation.ispartofdate2007
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelIntelligence artificielleen
dc.relation.confcountryINDIA
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateoui
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.date.updated2017-01-06T18:45:00Z
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