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dc.contributor.authorLang, Jérôme
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-18T10:35:10Z
dc.date.available2010-11-18T10:35:10Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5104
dc.descriptionHyderabad, Inde
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectPreference representation
dc.subjectvote
dc.subjectpreference relations
dc.subject.ddc006.3en
dc.titleVote and Aggregation in Combinatorial Domains with Structured Preferences
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenIn many real-world collective decision problems,the set of alternatives is a Cartesian product of finitevalue domains for each of a given set of variables.The prohibitive size of such domains makes it practically impossible to represent preference relationsexplicitly. Now, AI has been developing languagesfor representing preferences on such domains in asuccinct way, exploiting structural properties suchas conditional preferential independence. Here wereconsider voting and aggregation rules in the casewhere voters’ preferences have a common preferential independence structure, and address the decomposition a voting rule or an aggregation function following a linear order over variables.
dc.identifier.citationpages1366-1371
dc.relation.ispartoftitleIJCAI 2007, International Joint Conferences on Artifical Intelligence - Proceedings
dc.relation.ispartofeditorVeloso, Manuela
dc.relation.ispartofpublnameAAAI Press / IJCAI
dc.relation.ispartofpublcityPalo Alto (USA)
dc.relation.ispartofdate2007
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelIntelligence artificielleen
dc.relation.confcountryINDIA
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateoui
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.date.updated2017-01-06T18:43:40Z


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