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Efficient coalitions in Boolean games

dc.contributor.authorBonzon, Elise
dc.contributor.authorLagasquie-Schiex, Marie-Christine
HAL ID: 170004
ORCID: 0000-0002-8870-8171
dc.contributor.authorLang, Jérôme
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-18T08:38:18Z
dc.date.available2010-11-18T08:38:18Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5098
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectBoolean games
dc.subjectstrategic games
dc.subject.ddc006.3en
dc.titleEfficient coalitions in Boolean games
dc.typeChapitre d'ouvrage
dc.description.abstractenBoolean games are a logical setting for representing strategic games in a succinct way, taking advantage of the expressive power and conciseness of propositional logic. A Boolean game consists of a set of players, each of whom controlsa set of propositional variables and has a specific goal expressed by a propositional formula. We show here that Boolean games are a very simple setting, yetsophisticated enough, for studying coalitions. Due to the fact that players havedichotomous preferences, the following notion emerges naturally: a coalition ina Boolean game is efficient if it guarantees that the goal of each member of thecoalition is satisfied. We study the properties of efficient coalitions, and we givea characterization of efficient coalitions.
dc.identifier.citationpages330
dc.relation.ispartoftitleNew Perspectives on Games and Interaction
dc.relation.ispartofeditorVan Rooij, Robert
dc.relation.ispartofpublnameAmsterdam University Press
dc.relation.ispartofdate2008
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelIntelligence artificielleen
dc.relation.ispartofisbn978 90 8964 057 4
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateoui
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.date.updated2017-01-06T17:59:37Z


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