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Efficient coalitions in Boolean games

Bonzon, Elise; Lagasquie-Schiex, Marie-Christine; Lang, Jérôme (2008), Efficient coalitions in Boolean games, dans Van Rooij, Robert, New Perspectives on Games and Interaction, Amsterdam University Press, p. 330

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Type
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Date
2008
Titre de l'ouvrage
New Perspectives on Games and Interaction
Auteurs de l’ouvrage
Van Rooij, Robert
Éditeur
Amsterdam University Press
Isbn
978 90 8964 057 4
Pages
330
Métadonnées
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Auteur(s)
Bonzon, Elise
Lagasquie-Schiex, Marie-Christine cc
Lang, Jérôme
Résumé (EN)
Boolean games are a logical setting for representing strategic games in a succinct way, taking advantage of the expressive power and conciseness of propositional logic. A Boolean game consists of a set of players, each of whom controlsa set of propositional variables and has a specific goal expressed by a propositional formula. We show here that Boolean games are a very simple setting, yetsophisticated enough, for studying coalitions. Due to the fact that players havedichotomous preferences, the following notion emerges naturally: a coalition ina Boolean game is efficient if it guarantees that the goal of each member of thecoalition is satisfied. We study the properties of efficient coalitions, and we givea characterization of efficient coalitions.
Mots-clés
Boolean games; strategic games