• xmlui.mirage2.page-structure.header.title
    • français
    • English
  • Help
  • Login
  • Language 
    • Français
    • English
View Item 
  •   BIRD Home
  • LAMSADE (UMR CNRS 7243)
  • LAMSADE : Publications
  • View Item
  •   BIRD Home
  • LAMSADE (UMR CNRS 7243)
  • LAMSADE : Publications
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Browse

BIRDResearch centres & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesTypeThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesType

My Account

LoginRegister

Statistics

Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors
Thumbnail

Application of Stochastic Cooperative Games in Water Resources

Zara, Stefano; Patrone, Fioravante; Moretti, Stefano; Dinar, Ariel (2006), Application of Stochastic Cooperative Games in Water Resources, in Goetz, Renan-Ulrich, Frontiers in Water Resource Economics, Springer US, p. 1-20

View/Open
coop_games.PDF (42.07Kb)
Type
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Date
2006
Book title
Frontiers in Water Resource Economics
Book author
Goetz, Renan-Ulrich
Publisher
Springer US
ISBN
978-0-387-30055-9
Number of pages
275
Pages
1-20
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Zara, Stefano
Patrone, Fioravante
Moretti, Stefano cc
Dinar, Ariel
Abstract (EN)
Traditionally, cooperative game theory has been applied to a variety of water resource problems assuming a deterministic pattern of supply. On the other hand, in view of the important role that water plays in regional and local projects, and taking into account that with climate change affecting the water cycle, the world is expected to face more stochastic and extreme events of water supply, incorporating stochastic consideration of water supply becomes more acute in designing water facilities. Moreover, various water users may have different attitudes toward risk, depending on their economic, managerial, and institutional capacity. Therefore, the combination of stochastic events and players’ risk attitude become increasingly an important issue in designing water related economic activities that depend on cooperation among the users. In this paper we will apply a Stochastic GT framework, based on the work of Suijs and Borm (1996). We will use an example of a water treatment plant to illustrate the approach, although the principles hold also for cases of other water-related joint cost, such as for storage, etc. Our goal will be to offer, in the most simplified setting, some instances of problems which appear whenever one tries to take into account the stochastic aspects of the problem which is being modelled.
Subjects / Keywords
cooperative game theory; Water Resources; Stochastic Cooperative Games
JEL
C71 - Cooperative Games
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games

Related items

Showing items related by title and author.

  • Thumbnail
    Sharing the Costs of Complex Water Projects: Application to the West Delta Water Conservation and Irrigation Rehabilitation Project, Egypt. 
    Moretti, Stefano; Patrone, Fioravante; Dinar, Ariel; Abdel-Dayem, Safwat (2016) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    The G-Game: A Cooperative Game Approach for Resource Consolidation in Network Dimensioning 
    Bianzino, Aruna Prem; Roujean, Jean-Louis; Rossi, Dario; Moretti, Stefano (2010-07) Communication / Conférence
  • Thumbnail
    Coalitional games on biological networks to measure the power of genes 
    Moretti, Stefano; Fragnelli, Vito; Patrone, Fioravante; Bonassi, Stefano (2010) Communication / Conférence
  • Thumbnail
    Using coalitional games on biological networks to measure centrality and power of genes 
    Moretti, Stefano; Fragnelli, Vito; Patrone, Fioravante; Bonassi, Stefano (2010) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    The class of microarray games and the relevance index for genes 
    Moretti, Stefano; Patrone, Fioravante; Bonassi, Stefano (2007) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Dauphine PSL Bibliothèque logo
Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16
Phone: 01 44 05 40 94
Contact
Dauphine PSL logoEQUIS logoCreative Commons logo