Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment
Bracht, Juergen; Figuières, Charles; Ratto, Marisa (2008), Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment, Journal of Public Economics, 92, 1-2, p. 54-90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.005
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameJournal of Public Economics
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Abstract (EN)We compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods experiments. One mechanism, the Falkinger mechanism, rewards and penalizes agents for deviations from the average contributions to the public good (Falkinger mechanism). The other, the compensation mechanism, allows agents to subsidize the other agents' contributions (compensation mechanism). It is found that both mechanisms lead to an increase in the level of contributions to the public goods. However, the Falkinger mechanism predicts the average level of contributions more reliably than the compensation mechanism.
Subjects / Keywordsincentive mechanisms; voluntary provision; public goods
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Propper, Carol; von Hinke Kessler Scholder, Stephanie; Tominey, Emma; Ratto, Marisa; Burgess, Simon (2010) Article accepté pour publication ou publié