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The indirect effects of auditing taxpayers

Ratto, Marisa; Thomas, Richard; Ulph, David (2013), The indirect effects of auditing taxpayers, Public Finance Review, 41, 3, p. 317-333. 10.1177/1091142112448414

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Ratto 2009-05.pdf (286.4Kb)
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2013-05
Nom de la revue
Public Finance Review
Volume
41
Numéro
3
Éditeur
Sage
Pages
317-333
30
Identifiant publication
10.1177/1091142112448414
Métadonnées
Afficher la notice complète
Auteur(s)
Ratto, Marisa

Thomas, Richard
autre
Ulph, David
autre
Résumé (EN)
In this paper we focus on the effects of investigations on tax compliance. Results from empirical studies suggest that the effects of audits are not only in terms of recovered unpaid tax (direct effects), but there are also indirect effects in terms of future better compliance in the rest of the community. The evidence suggests that such indirect effects tend to outweigh the direct effect. However, current policy decisions of how to allocate investigation resources across different groups of taxpayers generally neglect the indirect effects, generating a potential resource misallocation issue. With the aim to clarify a possible mechanism through which the indirect effects work and hence to inform any policy recommendations, we model tax compliance as a social norm and decompose the total effect of an increase in the audit probability into a direct effect (increased expected fine) and a multiplier effect due to taxpayers’ interdependencies.
Mots-clés
optimal audit rule; tax evasion; social norm; opportunities to evade
JEL
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
H30 - General
K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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