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dc.contributor.authorChassagnon, Arnold
dc.contributor.authorAttar, Andrea
HAL ID: 741810
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-08T14:17:58Z
dc.date.available2010-09-08T14:17:58Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4717
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectNon-exclusivityen
dc.subjectInsuranceen
dc.subjectMoral hazarden
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelG22en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelD43en
dc.titleOn moral hazard and nonexclusive contractsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe study an economywhere intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. In this context, we show that, contrarily to what is commonly believed, market equilibria may fail to be efficient even if the planner is not allowed to enforce exclusivity of trades (third best inefficiency). Our setting is the same as that of Bisin and Guaitoli [Bisin, A., Guaitoli, D., 2004.Moral hazard with nonexclusive contracts. Rand Journal of Economics 2, 306–328].We hence argue that some of the equilibrium conditions they imposed are not necessary, and we exhibit a set of equilibrium allocations which fail to satisfy themen
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Mathematical Economics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol45en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue9-10en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2008-09
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages511-525en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.09.007en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen


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