• français
    • English
  • English 
    • français
    • English
  • Login
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.
BIRD Home

Browse

This CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsJournals BIRDResearch centres & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsJournals

My Account

Login

Statistics

View Usage Statistics

On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts

Thumbnail
View/Open
CR - attar-chassagnon.pdf (253.3Kb)
Date
2008
Dewey
Economie financière
Sujet
Non-exclusivity; Insurance; Moral hazard
JEL code
G22; D82; D43
Journal issue
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume
45
Number
9-10
Publication date
09-2008
Article pages
511-525
Publisher
Elsevier
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.09.007
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4717
Collections
  • LEDa : Publications
Metadata
Show full item record
Author
Chassagnon, Arnold
Attar, Andrea
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
We study an economywhere intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. In this context, we show that, contrarily to what is commonly believed, market equilibria may fail to be efficient even if the planner is not allowed to enforce exclusivity of trades (third best inefficiency). Our setting is the same as that of Bisin and Guaitoli [Bisin, A., Guaitoli, D., 2004.Moral hazard with nonexclusive contracts. Rand Journal of Economics 2, 306–328].We hence argue that some of the equilibrium conditions they imposed are not necessary, and we exhibit a set of equilibrium allocations which fail to satisfy them

  • Accueil Bibliothèque
  • Site de l'Université Paris-Dauphine
  • Contact
SCD Paris Dauphine - Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16

 Content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.0 France (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) license.