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dc.contributor.authorChevallier, Julien
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-19T15:32:16Z
dc.date.available2010-07-19T15:32:16Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4601
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectEmissions Tradingen
dc.subjectBankingen
dc.subjectBorrowingen
dc.subjectMarket Poweren
dc.subject.ddc333en
dc.subject.classificationjelC73en
dc.subject.classificationjelL11en
dc.subject.classificationjelQ52en
dc.titleIntertemporal Emissions Trading and Market Power : A Dominant Firm with Competitive Fringe Modelen
dc.typeChapitre d'ouvrage
dc.description.abstractenIn international emissions trading schemes such as the Kyoto Protocol and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, the suboptimal negotiation of the cap with respect to total pollution minimization leads us to critically examine the proposition that generous allocation of grandfathered permits by the regulator based on recent emissions might pave the way for dominant positions. Stemming from this politically given market imperfection, this chapter develops a differential Stackelberg game with two types of non cooperative agents: a large potentially dominant agent, and a competitive fringe whose size are exogenously determined. The strategic interactions are modeled on an intra-industry permits markets where agents can freely bank and borrow permits. This chapter contributes to the debate on initial permits allocation and market power by focusing on the effects of allowing banking and borrowing. A documented appraisal on whether or not such provisions should be included is frequently overlooked by the debate to introduce the permits market itself among other environmental regulation tools. Numerical simulations provide a quantitative illustration of the results obtained.en
dc.relation.ispartoftitleClimate Change, Emission Trading and Business Strategiesen
dc.relation.ispartofeditorPickl, S.
dc.relation.ispartofeditorHansjürgens, Bernd
dc.relation.ispartofeditorLetmathe, P.
dc.relation.ispartofeditorAntes, Ralf
dc.relation.ispartofpublnameSpringeren
dc.relation.ispartofpublcityBerlin
dc.relation.ispartofdate2011
dc.relation.ispartofpages284
dc.identifier.urlsitehttp://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00388207/fr/en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie de la terre et des ressources naturellesen
dc.relation.ispartofisbn978-0-415-55122-9en


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