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Selfish scheduling with setup times

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gourves.pdf (902.1Kb)
Date
2009
Collection title
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Collection Id
5929
Dewey
Recherche opérationnelle
Sujet
Scheduling
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_27
Conference name
5th International Workshop, WINE 2009
Conference date
12-2009
Conference city
Rome
Conference country
Italie
Book title
Internet and Network Economics, 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Rome, Italy, December 14-18, 2009. Proceedings
Publisher
Springer
Publisher city
Berlin
Year
2009
ISBN
978-3-642-10840-2
Book URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4488
Collections
  • LAMSADE : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Telelis, Orestis
Monnot, Jérôme
Gourvès, Laurent
Type
Communication / Conférence
Item number of pages
292-303
Abstract (EN)
We study multiprocessor scheduling games with setup times on identical machines. Given a set of scheduling policies (coordination mechanism) on the machines, each out of n players chooses a machine to assign his owned job to, so as to minimize his individual completion time. Each job has a processing length and is of a certain type. Same-type jobs incur a setup overhead to the machine they are assigned to. We study the Price of Anarchy with respect to the makespan of stable assignments, that are pure Nash or strong equilibria for the underlying strategic game. We study in detail the performance of a well established preemptive scheduling mechanism. In an effort to improve over its performance, we introduce a class of mechanisms with certain properties, for which we examine existence of pure Nash and strong equilibria. We identify their performance limitations, and analyze an optimum mechanism out of this class. Finally, we point out several interesting open problems.

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