dc.contributor.author | Muller, Christophe | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-06-11T13:35:47Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-06-11T13:35:47Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4334 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.subject | Tunisie | en |
dc.subject | normes de travail | en |
dc.subject | salaires | en |
dc.subject | emploi | en |
dc.subject | zones franches | en |
dc.subject | Social transfers | en |
dc.subject | Targeting | en |
dc.subject | Tunisia | en |
dc.subject | North Africa | en |
dc.subject | Social conflicts | en |
dc.subject | Poverty | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 334 | en |
dc.subject.classificationjel | I38 | en |
dc.subject.classificationjel | H53 | en |
dc.subject.classificationjel | D63 | en |
dc.title | Anti-Poverty Transfers without Riots in Tunisia | en |
dc.type | Document de travail / Working paper | |
dc.description.abstracten | We draw some lessons from the Tunisian experience of social reforms and associated civil conflict.
Our main interest is the riots that occurred after subsidy cuts and their possible substitution of price
subsidies by direct cash transfers. We propose new welfare indicators apt to assess policy reforms in
situations of fragile states. Finally, using micro level data we show that the plausible policy decision
depend on parameters describing the balance between poverty and program exclusion risk. In the
Tunisian case, only a much larger weight put on poverty relatively to exclusion could bring the
decision maker to substitute the in force price subsidies with direct cash transfers, for fear of social
unrest. | en |
dc.publisher.name | IRD | en |
dc.publisher.city | Paris | en |
dc.identifier.citationpages | 17 | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitle | DIAL Document de travail | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber | DT/2007-08 | en |
dc.description.sponsorshipprivate | oui | en |
dc.subject.ddclabel | Economie sociale | en |