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dc.contributor.authorChevallier, Julien
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-26T13:29:59Z
dc.date.available2010-05-26T13:29:59Z
dc.date.issued2006-11
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4228
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectmarket poweren
dc.subjectbanking borrowingen
dc.subjectEmissions tradingen
dc.subject.ddc333en
dc.subject.classificationjelQ52en
dc.subject.classificationjelL11en
dc.subject.classificationjelC73en
dc.titleA differential game of intertemporal emissions trading with market poweren
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenIn international emissions trading schemes such as the Kyoto Protocol and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, the sub- optimal negotiation of the cap with respect to total pollution minimization leads us to critically examine the proposition that generous allocation of grandfathered permits by the regulator based on recent emissions might pave the way for dominant positions. Stemming from this politically given market imperfection, this pa- per develops a differential Stackelberg game with two types of non-cooperative agents: a large potentially dominant agent and a competitive fringe whose size are exogenously determined. The strategic interactions are modelled on an intra-industry permits markets where agents can freely bank and borrow permits. This paper contributes to the debate on initial permits allocation and market power by focusing on the effects of allowing banking and borrowing. A documented appraisal on whether or not such provisions should be included is frequently overlooked by the debate to introduce the permits market itself among other environmental regulation tools. Results are presented under perfect information.en
dc.identifier.citationpages28en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie de la terre et des ressources naturellesen
dc.relation.conftitle56ème Congrès annuel de l'AFSE (Association Française de Science Economique)en
dc.relation.confdate2007-09
dc.relation.confcityParisen
dc.relation.confcountryFranceen


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