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dc.contributor.authorChevallier, Julien
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-26T09:08:05Z
dc.date.available2010-05-26T09:08:05Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4213
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectBanking borrowingen
dc.subjectEmissions tradingen
dc.subject.ddc333en
dc.subject.classificationjelC73en
dc.subject.classificationjelL11en
dc.subject.classificationjelQ52en
dc.titleStrategic manipulation on Emissions Trading Banking Program with fixed horizonen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThis paper considers a permit market with both spatial and intertemporal trading. The intertemporal market allows firms to freely borrow or bank permits over a pre-specified period of time. When this period is over, the permit bank has to be balanced, so firms cannot avoid compliance just by borrowing from the future. Market power is introduced by assuming a large dominant agent in a Stackelberg position and a large number of small firms who are nonstrategic but forward looking. The equilibrium is characterized by for the monopoly case and for intermediate cases.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameEconomics Bulletin
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol17en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue14en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2008-07
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages1-9en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherEconomics Bulletinen
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie de la terre et des ressources naturellesen


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