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dc.contributor.authorRenucci, Antoine
dc.contributor.authorLoss, Frédéric
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-10T07:14:54Z
dc.date.available2010-05-10T07:14:54Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4126
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectFirm Employment Decisionsen
dc.subjectPromotionsen
dc.subjectLabor Productivityen
dc.subjectProject Analysisen
dc.subject.ddc658.4en
dc.subject.classificationjelO22en
dc.subject.classificationjelJ24en
dc.subject.classificationjelJ3en
dc.subject.classificationjelM51en
dc.titleWhen Promotions Induce Good Managers to Be Lazyen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstractenIn our context, a good-reputation manager favors risk when being perceived as good allows to be promoted while risk is observable but not verifiable. Indeed, it renders more difficult the learning process regarding her talent. In turn, this lowers her level of effort since the extent to which effort impacts the perception the market has about her talent is lessened. We show how and when monitoring helps employers restore incentives to work. By contrast, career concerns discipline a bad-reputation manager in our context, provided that promotions are sufficiently attractive. These results hold when two managers of heterogeneous reputation compete for one position.en
dc.publisher.nameUniversité Paris-Dauphine
dc.publisher.cityParis
dc.identifier.citationpages52en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleCahiers de recherche Ceregen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber2004-12en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelDirection d'entrepriseen


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