Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorSalanié, François
dc.contributor.authorBontems, Philippe
dc.contributor.authorAubert, Cécile
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-03T09:49:21Z
dc.date.available2010-05-03T09:49:21Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4073
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectWater distributionen
dc.subjectCommon value auctionen
dc.subjectconcession and incentive contracten
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelD44en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelL51en
dc.titleOptimal concession of water services under common valueen
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherINRA, Toulouse;France
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversité de Toulouse;France
dc.description.abstractenWhen an incumbent firm is in charge of a distribution network, it accumulates information on the state of the network. This `common value' information creates a winner's curse during auctions for renewing the concession. The municipality contracting out the provision of the service trades off the incumbent's incentives to invest, with lower costs when changing supplier, and must induce effective competition despite the winner's curse. We show that the optimal concession contract can be designed to address this difficulty, with asymmetric auctions in which the incumbent is favored and increasing output schedules. Contrary to standard auctions, the winner's curse can be prevented at no expected cost.en
dc.identifier.citationpages21en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen
dc.relation.conftitleEuropean Economic Association & Econometric Societyen
dc.relation.confdate2006-08
dc.relation.confcityVienneen
dc.relation.confcountryAutricheen


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record