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dc.contributor.authorViossat, Yannick
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-23T08:16:29Z
dc.date.available2009-06-23T08:16:29Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/387
dc.descriptionLe fichier accessible ci-dessous est une version également éditée dans les Cahiers de la Chaire "Les Particuliers face aux Risques" de l'Institut de Finance de Dauphine, cahier n° 28, décembre 2008
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectCorrelated equilibrium; Linear duality; Unique equilibrium; Quasi-strict equilibriumen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72
dc.titleIs Having a Unique Equilibrium Robust?en
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publiéen_US
dc.description.abstractenWe investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of n-player finite games with a unique correlated equilibrium is open, while this is not true of Nash equilibrium for n>2. The crucial lemma is that a unique correlated equilibrium is a quasi-strict Nash equilibrium. Related results are studied. For instance, we show that generic two-person zero-sum games have a unique correlated equilibrium and that, while the set of symmetric bimatrix games with a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium is not open, the set of symmetric bimatrix games with a unique and quasi-strict symmetric Nash equilibrium is.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Mathematical Economics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol44en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue11en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2008-12
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages1152-1160en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.06.008en
dc.identifier.urlsitehttp://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00361891/en/en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen


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