Date
2000
Dewey
Gestion des entreprises
Sujet
Comportement organisationnel; Tomato; Governance; Authority
JEL code
L22; L15; L14
Journal issue
Acta Horticulturae
Number
536
Publication date
2000
Article pages
537-545
Publisher
International Society for Horticultural Science
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
In agricultural subsectors, collective organizations such as producer groups or second-degree cooperatives frequently cope with management of brand names. The success of these brand names depends upon the ability of actors to collectively create, guarantee and sustain a stream of rents based upon brand reputation. The key issue for these collective organizations will be to create specific coordination mechanisms in order to build and safeguard this reputation. Drawing from a real case in the French tomato sector, the research focus on the governance mechanisms, and especially authority and enforcement mechanisms. We show that the collective organization can be analyzed as a combination of governance mechanisms. These mechanisms are aligned with the main contractual hazards found between actors, and are a mix of individual and collective incentives, of external and internal controls and of authority based upon a delegation of power.