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dc.contributor.authorBelot, François
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-14T13:51:12Z
dc.date.available2010-01-14T13:51:12Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/2941
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectCorporate Governanceen
dc.subjectTakeover Premiumsen
dc.subjectShareholder Agreementsen
dc.subject.ddc658.1en
dc.subject.classificationjelG32en
dc.subject.classificationjelG34en
dc.titleDo target shareholder agreements induce bidders to pay higher premiums?en
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenIn listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. Such agreements are often viewed as means of insulating the firm from the market for corporate control. Specific provisions (namely concerted action, pre-emptive buying rights and repartitioning of board seats) are indeed likely to influence the outcome of takeovers. Using a sample of French deals, this paper investigates the impact of shareholder agreements on takeover premiums. A shareholder agreement is in force in 27.1% of target companies. A positive relationship between shareholder pacts and takeover premiums is observed. This result is robust to the use of an econometrical specification which treats as endogenous the existence of a shareholder agreement. This finding suggests that shareholder pacts dramatically increase the negotiating power of target shareholders.en
dc.identifier.citationpages35en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelOrganisation et finances d'entrepriseen
dc.relation.conftitleEFMA 2009en
dc.relation.confdate2009-06
dc.relation.confcityMilanen
dc.relation.confcountryItalieen


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