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Do target shareholder agreements induce bidders to pay higher premiums?

Belot, François (2009), Do target shareholder agreements induce bidders to pay higher premiums?, EFMA 2009, 2009-06, Milan, Italie

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EFMA2009_0546_fullpaper.pdf (239.0Kb)
Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2009
Conference title
EFMA 2009
Conference date
2009-06
Conference city
Milan
Conference country
Italie
Pages
35
Metadata
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Author(s)
Belot, François
Abstract (EN)
In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. Such agreements are often viewed as means of insulating the firm from the market for corporate control. Specific provisions (namely concerted action, pre-emptive buying rights and repartitioning of board seats) are indeed likely to influence the outcome of takeovers. Using a sample of French deals, this paper investigates the impact of shareholder agreements on takeover premiums. A shareholder agreement is in force in 27.1% of target companies. A positive relationship between shareholder pacts and takeover premiums is observed. This result is robust to the use of an econometrical specification which treats as endogenous the existence of a shareholder agreement. This finding suggests that shareholder pacts dramatically increase the negotiating power of target shareholders.
Subjects / Keywords
Corporate Governance; Takeover Premiums; Shareholder Agreements
JEL
G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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