• français
    • English
  • français 
    • français
    • English
  • Login
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.
BIRD Home

Browse

This CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsJournals BIRDResearch centres & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsJournals

My Account

Login

Statistics

View Usage Statistics

Cash holdings, corporate governance and financial constraints

Thumbnail
View/Open
0105.pdf (167.1Kb)
Date
2007
Dewey
Organisation et finances d'entreprise
Sujet
Governance; Financial Constraints; Cash Holdings
JEL code
G35; G32
Conference name
EFMA 2007
Conference date
06-2007
Conference city
Vienne
Conference country
Autriche
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/2938
Collections
  • DRM : Publications
Metadata
Show full item record
Author
Saddour, Khaoula
Ginglinger, Edith
Type
Communication / Conférence
Item number of pages
33
Abstract (EN)
We examine the relation between cash holdings, quality of governance and financial constraints. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights hold more cash, contrary to the predictions of agency theory. This result is partly due to the positive correlation that exists between governance quality measures and the degree of financial constraint faced by the firm. We show that governance quality has no impact on cash holdings by financially unconstrained firms. It does, however, have a positive impact on the cash holdings of certain financially constrained firms, particularly family firms. Anti-takeover provisions give these firms extra flexibility, enabling them to issue shares without the founding family losing control, and provide an alternative to high cash holdings.

  • Accueil Bibliothèque
  • Site de l'Université Paris-Dauphine
  • Contact
SCD Paris Dauphine - Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16

 Content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.0 France (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) license.